Using smart cards for authenticating in public services: A comparative study by Arroyo, David et al.
  
 
 
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 
https://repositorio.uam.es  
Esta es la versión de autor de la comunicación de congreso publicada en: 
This is an author produced version of a paper published in: 
 
International Joint Conference: CISIS’15 and ICEUTE’15. Advances in 
Intelligent Systems and Computing, Volumen 369. Springer, 2015. 437-446 
 
DOI:    http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19713-5_37  
 
Copyright: © 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland 
 
El acceso a la versión del editor puede requerir la suscripción del recurso 
Access to the published version may require subscription 
 
Using smart cards for authenticating in public
services: A comparative study
D. Arroyo Guarde~no1, V. Gayoso Martnez2, L. Hernandez Encinas2, and
A. Martn Mu~noz2
1 Grupo de Neurocomputacion Biologica, Departamento de Ingeniera Informatica,
Escuela Politecnica Superior, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
david.arroyo@uam.es
2 Institute of Physical and Information Technologies (ITEFI)
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), Madrid, Spain
fvictor.gayoso,luis,agusting@iec.csic.es
Abstract. Smart cards are well-known tamper-resistant devices, and
as such they represent an excellent platform for implementing strong
authentication. Many services requesting high levels of security rely on
smart cards, which provide a convenient security token due to their porta-
bility. This contribution analyses two Spanish smart card deployments
intended to be used for accessing eGoverment services, comparing their
respective contents and capabilities.
Keywords: Cryptography, Digital signature, Electronic prescription,
Smart cards
1 Introduction
Secure electronic identication is an important enabler of data protection and
the prevention of online fraud. These aspects have a great importance in areas
such as eGovernment, which consists of the digital interactions between gover-
ments, citizens, public agencies, and employees. In this scenario, the European
Commission's eGovernment Action Plan 2011-2015 supports the provision of a
new generation of eGovernment services, as well as the strengthening of services
already deployed [1].
As a measure of its importance, only in Spain more than 480 million admin-
istrative procedures were conducted by citizens and companies with the central
government in 2013, of which over 367 million (76.5%) were conducted elec-
tronically and over 112 million (23.5%) by other means. For enterprises, 94%
of administrative procedures were done electronically and for citizens 65% [2].
Among the services for citizens most widely used in Spain we can nd those re-
lated to income taxes (declarations, notications of assessment, etc.), social secu-
rity benets (unemployment, pensions, etc.), the request of personal documents
(passports, driving licences, etc.), and health related services (appointments for
hospitals, etc.) [2].
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This contribution analyses two smart card deployments for the authentica-
tion of users in public services, comparing their respective characteristics and
capabilities: the Spanish electronic identity card (known as DNIe, Documento
Nacional de Identidad electronico), and the smart card delivered to part of the
medical doctors working at the Community of Madrid for the electronic pre-
scription service, which in this contribution will be referred to as the EPSC
(Electronic Prescription Smart Card).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
introduction to smart cards. Section 3 shows the details of the DNIe. In Section
4, the main features of the EPSC are included. Section 5 oers a comparison of
both smart cards. Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 Smart cards
A smart card is a plastic card with an embedded chip that controls the access to
the stored data. The two most widespread communication models for smart cards
are the byte-oriented, half duplex transmission protocol T=0 and the block-
oriented, half duplex protocol T=1, both dened in ISO/IEC 7816-3 [3]. The
T=1 protocol is newer, and implements error detection capabilities.
The elements known as APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit), built ac-
cording to the ISO/IEC 7816-3 [3] and 7816-4 [4] specications, are the data
packets exchanged between the external application and the card by means of a
smart card reader. The card operating system is responsible for analysing any
incoming APDU and redirecting it to the application it is intended for. The op-
erating system is also responsible for retrieving the response data from the card
application and submitting it to the external application using the card reader.
There are two types of APDUs: command and response. Figure 1 shows the
format of command APDUs, which consist of a header and optionally a body
with the following elements:
Header (mandatory)
Command APDU
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le
Body (optional)
Fig. 1: Command APDU
{ CLA (1 byte): Command class.
{ INS (1 byte): Specic instruction within the class.
{ P1 (1 byte): First parameter associated to the instruction. It can be used to
give more information about the instruction, or as input data.
{ P2 (1 byte): Second parameter associated to the instruction. As in the pre-
vious case, it can be used to give more information about the instruction, or
as input data.
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{ Lc (1 byte, optional): Number of bytes in the data eld of the command.
Since its highest value is 0xFF, the maximum data length is 255 bytes, al-
though some cards allow to send 256 bytes using the value 0x00.
{ Data (variable size, optional): Information to be processed by the applet.
{ Le (1 byte, optional): Maximum number of bytes to be included in the data
eld of the response APDU.
In comparison, the format of any response APDU is simpler (see Figure 2),
as it only includes the following items:
Body (optional)
Response APDU
Result (mandatory)
Data SW1 SW2
Fig. 2: Response APDU
{ Data (variable length, optional): Information returned by the card applica-
tion.
{ SW1 (1 byte): First status byte, which provides general information about
the result of the command execution.
{ SW2 (1 byte): Second status byte.
Following the ISO/IEC 7816 notation, the smart card le structure is repre-
sented by means of two types of elements: DF (Dedicated File) and EF (Elemen-
tary File). While DFs can be interpreted as directories or folders of a standard le
system, EFs can be considered to be data les, belonging either to the operating
system or to other smart card applications.
3 DNIe
The DNIe is a T=0 smart card that allows to certify the identity of the DNIe
holder and to digitally sign documents using electronic signature protocols with
the same legal validity than a handwritten signature [5]. The DNIe is the sound-
est and preferred method to prove one's own identity in any act with the Public
Administration. Since it was started to be issued, more than 43 millions of DNIe
cards have been delivered to citizens [6].
In January 2015, it was announced a new version of the DNIe, called DNIe
3.0, witch incorporates an NFC (Near Field Communications) chip with the goal
to facilitate its usage with smartphones and tablets, avoiding the limitation of
delivering smart card readers to potential users.
Figure 3 (left) shows the le tree of the DNIe, where the Master File (typi-
cally represented as the DF 3F00) is the root directory of the le system.
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DNIe - Master File
EF 0000
EF 0005
EF 0006
EF 0012
EF 0021
EF 2F03
EF 601F
EF 6020
EF 60A1
EF 60A8
DF 3F11 (ICC.Crypto)
EF 0101
EF 0102
DF 3F15 (ICC.ID)
EF 010F
EF 011F
EF 0201
DF 5015 (PKCS-15)
EF 5031
EF 5032
EF 5033
EF 6000
EF 6001
EF 6002
EF 6004
EF 6005
DF 6031 (DNIe.Admin)
EF 7001
EF 7002
EF 7003
DF 6061 (DNIe.Pub)
EF 7006
DF 6081 (DNIe.Priv)
EF 7004
EF 7005
EPSC - Master File
EF 2F01
EF 2F02
EF 80FF
EF 8100
EF FD01
DF 2FFF
EF 0000
EF 7F0F
EF 8010
EF 8011
EF 8012
EF 8016
EF 8017
EF 8100
EF 8101
EF 8102
EF 8108
EF 8220
EF 8221
EF 8222
EF 8223
EF 8224
EF 8225
EF 8228
DF 8110
EF 8013
EF 8014
EF 8015
EF 811F
Fig. 3: File structure of the DNIe (left) and EPSC (right)
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The information stored in the chip is divided into three areas with dierent
access levels and security conditions [7{9]:
{ Public area: Reading access without restrictions. It includes, among others,
the following les:
 EF 601F: X.509 component certicate (each DNIe has a dierent compo-
nent certicate associated to the actual smart card), with an RSA public
key of 1024 bits.
 EF 6020: X.509 certicate of the component intermediate CA (Certi-
cation Authority), with an RSA public key of 1024 bits.
 EF 7006: X.509 certicate of the DGP (Direccion General de la Polica)
intermediate CA, with an RSA public key of 2048 bits.
{ Private area: Reading access allowed after validation of the citizen's PIN
(Personal Identication Number) code. Some of the les included are the
following:
 EF 7004: X.509 user signing certicate with an RSA key of 2048 bits.
 EF 7005: X.509 user authentication certicate with an RSA public key
of 2048 bits.
{ Security area: Reading access allowed only after biometric verication. In
order to make this verication, the citizen must use the biometric devices
located at the DNIe issuing oces. The les protected by this procedure are
the following:
 EF 7001: Citizen's liation data (name, surname, date of birth, etc.).
 EF 7002: Digitized image of the citizen's photograph.
 EF 7003: Digitized image of the citizen's handwritten signature.
Given that the DNIe is a device linked to the identity of the citizens, its secu-
rity, both physical and electronic, is of paramount importance. In that sense, the
DNIe is a SSCD (Secure Signature Creation Device) compliant with the Euro-
pean standard EN 14890-1 [10], which denes how to establish a communication
between the SSCD and an external application. Because of that, the operating
system of the DNIe subordinates the sending of certain APDUs (like the Verify
PIN command) to the establishment of a secure channel [11].
In order to establish the secure channel, it is necessary to exchange the public
keys of the card and the external application that wants to communicate with
the DNIe. After those certicates are veried by both parties, they must perform
a mutual authentication protocol, including a seed exchange for the derivation
of the encryption and MAC (Message Authentication Code) session keys. Once
the secure channel is established, any command must be protected before its
transmission using the session keys.
In the descriptions that follow, the word terminal represents the pair formed
by the software application that intends to communicate with the DNIe and the
physical device where the application is executed, while the word card is used
as an alternative to the terms DNIe and smart card.
The establishment of the secure channel consists of the following four phases:
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1. Certicate exchange and verication:
Before starting the mutual authentication process, the terminal must send
its authentication certicate to the card, so the DNIe can verify that the
certicate is correct and has been properly signed by a trusted certication
authority. If that is the case, the application will request the card component
certicate in order to verify it. Once this exchange is completed, the appli-
cation will have the public key and the certicate associated to the card,
whilst the card will have obtained the public key and the certicate of the
terminal.
2. Internal authentication:
In this phase, the terminal must request the card to perform a valid authen-
tication. In order to do this, the terminal must generate a random number
that is sent to the card as a challenge. The card uses this value to generate
in turn its contribution to the session key creation process. If the terminal
is able to recover that value, this means that the data provided by the card
was valid and that the card has been successfully authenticated.
3. External authentication:
After the two previous phases, the terminal has identied the card as a valid
DNIe. In order to complete the mutual authentication procedure, it is neces-
sary to perform now the external authentication process, so the terminal is
authenticated by the card, following a process similar to that of the previous
phase.
4. Session key generation:
The last step consists in calculating the encryption and MAC keys that will
be used in the communication through the secure channel.
4 Electronic Prescription Smart Card
EPS (Electronic Prescribing and Dispensing) is the term that identies the sys-
tem and processes that allow all the stages of the prescribing, supply of medicine,
and claiming process to be completed electronically, providing an alternative to
the typical paper based prescription system in public health environments.
EPS enables prescribers (mainly medical doctors) to create, sign, and send
prescriptions electronically to a dispenser (such as a pharmacy) of the patient's
choice or to a central server, from where they can be electronically retrieved by
any dispenser. This makes the prescribing and dispensing process more ecient
and convenient both for patients and the medical sta. EPS is a key initiative
currently being implemented or already deployed in many countries (e.g. United
Kingdom [12], Australia [13], etc.), and the European Union is focusing now in
developing the interoperability of electronic prescriptions [14].
In Spain, the electronic prescription system being rolled out is not yet com-
pleted. As of December 2014, 89; 58% of general health centers, 52; 56% of local
clinics, 66; 21% of specialized centers, and 89; 35% of pharmacies were already
working with the new system nationwide, though the gures vary a lot between
Autonomous Communities [15] (for example, at the beginning of 2014 it was al-
ready implemented in Communities such as Andaluca or Galicia, while in other
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Communities such as Murcia it is expected to be rolled out during 2015 [16]).
In the Community of Madrid, where we have made our study, the new system
started to work across all the region at the end of 2014 [17].
In the current phase of the EPS deployment in the Community of de Madrid,
medical doctors sign the prescriptions electronically using their login credentials.
However, in next phases this system is expected to be replaced by a strong au-
thentication scheme based on smart cards, and with that goal medical doctors
have received their own, individual smart cards. As mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, in this contribution we will refer to this smart card as EPSC, which is a
T=1 smart card.
Figure 3 (right) shows the complete le structure of the EPSC. All the les
included in the gure can be read without verifying the user's PIN. The most
interesting les are the following ones:
{ EF 2F02: It includes the serial number of the smart card.
{ EF 8223: This le contains details about the user, mainly the name, surname,
and NIF (Numero de Identicacion Fiscal, the identication number of each
Spanish citizen consisting of a sequence of 8 digits and a letter associated
with that sequence. The NIF is the identication number displayed at the
DNIe).
{ EF 8224: It includes details about the intermediate CA.
{ EF 8228: This le stores all the elements in the certicate chain up to the
user's certicate, as it is displayed in Figure 4. Camerrma is a company
participated by more than 85 spanish Chambers of Commerce [18], and that
is part of Chambersign, a European organization that provides support to
national Chambers of Commerce from a supranational standpoint [19]. All
three certicates shown in Figure 4 are related to RSA keys of 2048 bits.
Chambersign Chambers of Commerce (root certificate)
Camerfirma (intermediate certificate)
User's certificate
Fig. 4: EPSC certicate chain
Unlike the DNIe, it is not necessary to establish a secure channel before send-
ing some APDUs like the Verify PIN command. Apart from that, it is interesting
to point out that many les have an empty content (i.e., sequences of the byte
0x00). Presumably, the content of those les will be updated once the smart
cards begin to be used.
Another dierence between DNIe and EPSC is that, while the former follows
the indications given by the PKCS #15 (Public-Key Cryptography Standards)
standard [20], the le structure of the latter is not compliant with that speci-
cation.
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5 Comparison
The chip mounted by the DNIe received the EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level
5 augmented) accreditation in 2005 [21]. Besides, version 1.13 of the DNIe was
evaluated as a smart card by the National Cryptologic Centre (CCN, Centro
Criptologico Nacional), a government organization that belongs to the National
Centre of Intelligence (CNI, Centro Nacional de Inteligencia), and obtained the
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented) certication in 2007 [22].
The DNIe is equipped with several physical elements that allow to consider it
a highly secure physical token. Among those items, we can highlight the following
[7]: holograms, kinegrams, optically variable inks, changeable laser images, sur-
face relief structures, inks visible only under infrared or ultraviolet light, citizen's
photography and handwritten signature engraved with laser, etc. In comparison,
the EPSC is not equipped with the physical countermeasures just mentioned,
and the details about its accreditation are not public.
Regarding their cryptographic capabilities, both the DNIe and EPSC con-
tain the user's X.509 certicate as well as an associated 2048-bit RSA key pair
intended for performing digital signatures.
However, the security of the DNIe is much more robust, as it only allows to
send certain commands after establishing a secure channel which authenticates
both the smart card and the software communicating with it. In the DNIe,
the retrieval of certain elements, such as the user's certicates, can only be
accomplished after correctly entering the PIN code. As the APDU containing the
Verify PIN command can only be sent through the secure channel, an attacker
cannot access the content of the user's certicates unless he knows the PIN code
and establishes the secure channel. Another consequence of this scheme is that
no attacker can block the PIN code of the DNIe without completing the process
that sets up the secure channel.
In comparison, the EPSC allows to read all the les of its le system without
the need of entering the PIN code, which allows an attacker to retrieve the user's
certicate if he has access to the smart card. Besides, the attacker could block
the PIN code, which would render the legitimate user unable to make signatures
unless he was in possession of the PUK (Personal Unlocking Key) code.
Regarding the Spanish legislation associated to digital signatures, we remind
the readers that the Law 59/2003 establishes the following concepts [5]:
{ Electronic signature: It is the set of electronic data that can be utilized as a
means of identifying the signing user.
{ Advanced electronic signature: It is the electronic signature that allows the
signing user to be identied. The signature must be created by methods that
the signing user can keep under his exclusive control.
{ Qualied electronic signature: It is the advanced electronic signature based
on a qualied certicate and generated by a secure signature creation device.
Based on those denitions, the DNIe can be considered as a device that allows
to generate qualied electronic signatures. The EPSC, unless fully accredited,
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would have to be considered as a device allowing to generate only advanced
electronic signatures which could not be used in another environments.
6 Conclusions
As described in the previous sections, the DNIe is a highly secure, certicated
smart card that allows to generate qualied electronic signatures. Even though
some technical information about the EPSC is not available to researchers, it
can be considered a less robust authentication device.
If we take into account that the latest version of the DNIe includes support
for NFC devices, it seems reasonable to suggest the use of the DNIe instead
of the EPSC for the task of signing the electronic prescriptions. This decision
would be doubly benecial: on the one hand, it would allow to avoid the cost of
purchasing the smart cards and delivering them to the medical doctors; on the
other hand, it would allow doctors working with NFC-capable devices such as
modern tablets and smartphones to avoid installing smart card readers, which
additionally represent an avoidable cost for health centres that had not purchased
them before.
Finally, from a standards perspective, the DNIe fully adapts to the PKCS
#15 structure, which facilitates interoperability with future applications.
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